Are there mathematical premises that don't hold true whithin other mathematical systems/ways of thinking?...












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I do not really know how to phrase the question, but it is as follows: Are there mathematical premises that don't hold truth given different systems? And can someone give me examples?



For example take: the inside angles of a triangle, in Euclidean space, sum up to 180 degrees. However it is not possible to demonstrate that the interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees in Euclidean space, within other systems, such as spherical geometry or hyperbolic geometry.










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closed as too broad by Paul Frost, Shaun, Lee David Chung Lin, José Carlos Santos, Mostafa Ayaz Nov 26 '18 at 16:48


Please edit the question to limit it to a specific problem with enough detail to identify an adequate answer. Avoid asking multiple distinct questions at once. See the How to Ask page for help clarifying this question. If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.











  • 2




    Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
    – Noah Schweber
    Nov 25 '18 at 17:45


















2














I do not really know how to phrase the question, but it is as follows: Are there mathematical premises that don't hold truth given different systems? And can someone give me examples?



For example take: the inside angles of a triangle, in Euclidean space, sum up to 180 degrees. However it is not possible to demonstrate that the interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees in Euclidean space, within other systems, such as spherical geometry or hyperbolic geometry.










share|cite|improve this question















closed as too broad by Paul Frost, Shaun, Lee David Chung Lin, José Carlos Santos, Mostafa Ayaz Nov 26 '18 at 16:48


Please edit the question to limit it to a specific problem with enough detail to identify an adequate answer. Avoid asking multiple distinct questions at once. See the How to Ask page for help clarifying this question. If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.











  • 2




    Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
    – Noah Schweber
    Nov 25 '18 at 17:45
















2












2








2


1





I do not really know how to phrase the question, but it is as follows: Are there mathematical premises that don't hold truth given different systems? And can someone give me examples?



For example take: the inside angles of a triangle, in Euclidean space, sum up to 180 degrees. However it is not possible to demonstrate that the interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees in Euclidean space, within other systems, such as spherical geometry or hyperbolic geometry.










share|cite|improve this question















I do not really know how to phrase the question, but it is as follows: Are there mathematical premises that don't hold truth given different systems? And can someone give me examples?



For example take: the inside angles of a triangle, in Euclidean space, sum up to 180 degrees. However it is not possible to demonstrate that the interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees in Euclidean space, within other systems, such as spherical geometry or hyperbolic geometry.







logic foundations






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edited Nov 25 '18 at 19:07









Andrés E. Caicedo

64.8k8158246




64.8k8158246










asked Nov 25 '18 at 17:40









Brian Blumberg

127111




127111




closed as too broad by Paul Frost, Shaun, Lee David Chung Lin, José Carlos Santos, Mostafa Ayaz Nov 26 '18 at 16:48


Please edit the question to limit it to a specific problem with enough detail to identify an adequate answer. Avoid asking multiple distinct questions at once. See the How to Ask page for help clarifying this question. If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.






closed as too broad by Paul Frost, Shaun, Lee David Chung Lin, José Carlos Santos, Mostafa Ayaz Nov 26 '18 at 16:48


Please edit the question to limit it to a specific problem with enough detail to identify an adequate answer. Avoid asking multiple distinct questions at once. See the How to Ask page for help clarifying this question. If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.










  • 2




    Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
    – Noah Schweber
    Nov 25 '18 at 17:45
















  • 2




    Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
    – Noah Schweber
    Nov 25 '18 at 17:45










2




2




Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
– Noah Schweber
Nov 25 '18 at 17:45






Sure, mathematicians study lots of alternate axiom systems, or even alternatives to the standard logical framework.
– Noah Schweber
Nov 25 '18 at 17:45












2 Answers
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In standard (“classical”) logic, if you can prove that a statement is true, you can conclude that it is not false, and if you can prove it is not false, you can conclude that it is true. In intuitionistic logic, the first is acceptable, but the second one is considered invalid.



(In notation, intuitionistic logic accepts $Ptolnotlnot P$ but rejects $lnotlnot Pto P$. “$xto y$” means that from $x$ you can infer $y$, and “$lnot x$” means that $x$ is false.)






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  • 1




    I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
    – DanielV
    Nov 25 '18 at 19:09



















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To put some perspective on the example you gave, imagine a world in which we knew about the counting numbers $1,2ldots,$ but we didn't know about $0.$ We might try, as the Greeks did with geometry, to write down some axioms of arithmetic: $$x +y =y+x\x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z\xy=yx\x(yz)=(xy)z\x(y+z)=xy+xz.$$ We might think it reasonable that we should be able to prove the well-known fact that $x+yne x,$ but try as we might, we would never be able to. That's because we could be working in the naturals ${0,1,2ldots},$ instead of the counting numbers ${1,2,ldots},$ in which case our axioms still hold, but the "well-known fact" is not true, so the fact cannot be a consequence of these axioms.



(Actually, the axioms I wrote down are even weaker than that: they don't even preclude the case of a very boring world in which zero is the only number.)



So examples like the case of the parallel postulate that you mention are pretty easy to come by. For instance, the idea that "every polynomial has a root" is absurd with respect to the real numbers, but is true in the complex numbers.






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    2 Answers
    2






    active

    oldest

    votes








    2 Answers
    2






    active

    oldest

    votes









    active

    oldest

    votes






    active

    oldest

    votes









    1














    In standard (“classical”) logic, if you can prove that a statement is true, you can conclude that it is not false, and if you can prove it is not false, you can conclude that it is true. In intuitionistic logic, the first is acceptable, but the second one is considered invalid.



    (In notation, intuitionistic logic accepts $Ptolnotlnot P$ but rejects $lnotlnot Pto P$. “$xto y$” means that from $x$ you can infer $y$, and “$lnot x$” means that $x$ is false.)






    share|cite|improve this answer



















    • 1




      I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
      – DanielV
      Nov 25 '18 at 19:09
















    1














    In standard (“classical”) logic, if you can prove that a statement is true, you can conclude that it is not false, and if you can prove it is not false, you can conclude that it is true. In intuitionistic logic, the first is acceptable, but the second one is considered invalid.



    (In notation, intuitionistic logic accepts $Ptolnotlnot P$ but rejects $lnotlnot Pto P$. “$xto y$” means that from $x$ you can infer $y$, and “$lnot x$” means that $x$ is false.)






    share|cite|improve this answer



















    • 1




      I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
      – DanielV
      Nov 25 '18 at 19:09














    1












    1








    1






    In standard (“classical”) logic, if you can prove that a statement is true, you can conclude that it is not false, and if you can prove it is not false, you can conclude that it is true. In intuitionistic logic, the first is acceptable, but the second one is considered invalid.



    (In notation, intuitionistic logic accepts $Ptolnotlnot P$ but rejects $lnotlnot Pto P$. “$xto y$” means that from $x$ you can infer $y$, and “$lnot x$” means that $x$ is false.)






    share|cite|improve this answer














    In standard (“classical”) logic, if you can prove that a statement is true, you can conclude that it is not false, and if you can prove it is not false, you can conclude that it is true. In intuitionistic logic, the first is acceptable, but the second one is considered invalid.



    (In notation, intuitionistic logic accepts $Ptolnotlnot P$ but rejects $lnotlnot Pto P$. “$xto y$” means that from $x$ you can infer $y$, and “$lnot x$” means that $x$ is false.)







    share|cite|improve this answer














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    answered Nov 25 '18 at 19:04


























    community wiki





    MJD









    • 1




      I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
      – DanielV
      Nov 25 '18 at 19:09














    • 1




      I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
      – DanielV
      Nov 25 '18 at 19:09








    1




    1




    I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
    – DanielV
    Nov 25 '18 at 19:09




    I'm not sure it is right to call DNE invalid in constructive logic...it is certainly valid sometimes, and it never contradicts anything. AFAIK it doesn't go beyond simply being "unassumed".
    – DanielV
    Nov 25 '18 at 19:09











    1














    To put some perspective on the example you gave, imagine a world in which we knew about the counting numbers $1,2ldots,$ but we didn't know about $0.$ We might try, as the Greeks did with geometry, to write down some axioms of arithmetic: $$x +y =y+x\x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z\xy=yx\x(yz)=(xy)z\x(y+z)=xy+xz.$$ We might think it reasonable that we should be able to prove the well-known fact that $x+yne x,$ but try as we might, we would never be able to. That's because we could be working in the naturals ${0,1,2ldots},$ instead of the counting numbers ${1,2,ldots},$ in which case our axioms still hold, but the "well-known fact" is not true, so the fact cannot be a consequence of these axioms.



    (Actually, the axioms I wrote down are even weaker than that: they don't even preclude the case of a very boring world in which zero is the only number.)



    So examples like the case of the parallel postulate that you mention are pretty easy to come by. For instance, the idea that "every polynomial has a root" is absurd with respect to the real numbers, but is true in the complex numbers.






    share|cite|improve this answer


























      1














      To put some perspective on the example you gave, imagine a world in which we knew about the counting numbers $1,2ldots,$ but we didn't know about $0.$ We might try, as the Greeks did with geometry, to write down some axioms of arithmetic: $$x +y =y+x\x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z\xy=yx\x(yz)=(xy)z\x(y+z)=xy+xz.$$ We might think it reasonable that we should be able to prove the well-known fact that $x+yne x,$ but try as we might, we would never be able to. That's because we could be working in the naturals ${0,1,2ldots},$ instead of the counting numbers ${1,2,ldots},$ in which case our axioms still hold, but the "well-known fact" is not true, so the fact cannot be a consequence of these axioms.



      (Actually, the axioms I wrote down are even weaker than that: they don't even preclude the case of a very boring world in which zero is the only number.)



      So examples like the case of the parallel postulate that you mention are pretty easy to come by. For instance, the idea that "every polynomial has a root" is absurd with respect to the real numbers, but is true in the complex numbers.






      share|cite|improve this answer
























        1












        1








        1






        To put some perspective on the example you gave, imagine a world in which we knew about the counting numbers $1,2ldots,$ but we didn't know about $0.$ We might try, as the Greeks did with geometry, to write down some axioms of arithmetic: $$x +y =y+x\x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z\xy=yx\x(yz)=(xy)z\x(y+z)=xy+xz.$$ We might think it reasonable that we should be able to prove the well-known fact that $x+yne x,$ but try as we might, we would never be able to. That's because we could be working in the naturals ${0,1,2ldots},$ instead of the counting numbers ${1,2,ldots},$ in which case our axioms still hold, but the "well-known fact" is not true, so the fact cannot be a consequence of these axioms.



        (Actually, the axioms I wrote down are even weaker than that: they don't even preclude the case of a very boring world in which zero is the only number.)



        So examples like the case of the parallel postulate that you mention are pretty easy to come by. For instance, the idea that "every polynomial has a root" is absurd with respect to the real numbers, but is true in the complex numbers.






        share|cite|improve this answer












        To put some perspective on the example you gave, imagine a world in which we knew about the counting numbers $1,2ldots,$ but we didn't know about $0.$ We might try, as the Greeks did with geometry, to write down some axioms of arithmetic: $$x +y =y+x\x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z\xy=yx\x(yz)=(xy)z\x(y+z)=xy+xz.$$ We might think it reasonable that we should be able to prove the well-known fact that $x+yne x,$ but try as we might, we would never be able to. That's because we could be working in the naturals ${0,1,2ldots},$ instead of the counting numbers ${1,2,ldots},$ in which case our axioms still hold, but the "well-known fact" is not true, so the fact cannot be a consequence of these axioms.



        (Actually, the axioms I wrote down are even weaker than that: they don't even preclude the case of a very boring world in which zero is the only number.)



        So examples like the case of the parallel postulate that you mention are pretty easy to come by. For instance, the idea that "every polynomial has a root" is absurd with respect to the real numbers, but is true in the complex numbers.







        share|cite|improve this answer












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        answered Nov 25 '18 at 20:11









        spaceisdarkgreen

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